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Abstract 
In the paper, we propose a new method to examine adverse selection against advantageous 
selection, and our empirical evidence supports the existence of adverse selection as shown by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). By using a unique tracking sample with 216,942 observations based on 
Taiwan’s comprehensive automobile insurance market, we find that the past purchasing records of 
insurance coverage can predict the occurrence of risk in the future. We also find that controlling past 
records of the insured is only able to mitigate but not eliminate the asymmetric information problems in 
the market. We further provide evidence to show that both moral hazard and adverse selection could 
co-exist in the market. Since past records could control adverse selection but not moral hazard, past 
records may have a limited effect in terms of controlling asymmetric information with both adverse 
selection and moral hazard. 
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Can Purchasing Records Predict Risk? 
 
Introduction 
The adverse selection theory has been one of the cornerstones in insurance both 
in academia and in practice. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that the 
insurance market under adverse selection could settle on a separating equilibrium 
where high risks purchase high coverage at a high premium rate and low risks 
purchase low coverage at a low premium rate. Hence, the risk and the coverage are 
positively correlated. 
Following the theoretical studies, many empirical papers have also found 
evidence of adverse selection by examining whether there exists a positive 
relationship between risk and coverage1, for example, Cardon and Hendel (2001) in 
the health insurance market of the US, Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) in the annuity 
market in the UK, and Cohen (2005) in the automobile insurance market in Israel. 
However, many empirical papers have failed to find empirical evidence for the 
positive relationship between risk and coverage to support the existence of adverse 
selection in the real insurance business2. Some of the studies have even found a 
                                                 
1 It is worth pointing out that both moral hazard and adverse selection predict a positive relationship 
between risk and coverage as discussed by Chiappori and Salanie (2000). 
2 Some papers have found that the choice of the coverage and the occurrence of the risk are not 
significantly correlated, such as Chiappori and Salanie (1997), Richaudeau (1999), Chiappori and 
Salanie (2000) and Dionne, Gourieroux and Vanasse (2003) in the automobile insurance market in 
significantly negative relationship between risk and coverage, such as Cawley and 
Philipson (1999) in the life insurance market in the US, Finkelstein and McGarry 
(2006) in the long-term care insurance market in the US, Davidoff and Welke (2004) 
in the reverse mortgage insurance market in the US, Gronqvist (2004) in the dental 
care insurance market in Sweden, and Fang, Keane and Silverman (2005) in the 
medigap insurance market in the US. 
To explain why the choice of the coverage and the occurrence of the risk are 
negatively correlated, de Meza and Webb (2001) have provided an intriguing theory 
which they refer to as advantageous selection. de Meza and Webb (2001) assume that 
the insurer cannot observe the risk preference of the insured and the effort of the 
insured in terms of loss prevention. They further show that highly risk-averse 
individuals expend more effort on reducing the loss probability to become low-risk 
insured, whereas low risk-averse individuals expend less effort in order to reduce the 
loss probability and become high-risk insured. Since the risk preference of the 
individual is private information, the insurer screens the insured by offering high 
coverage to attract highly risk-averse individuals while offering low coverage to 
attract low risk-averse individuals. Therefore, asymmetric information in terms of the 
risk preference could make the market equilibrium settle on high risk with low 
                                                                                                                                            
France; Dionne, Gourieroux and Vanasse (2001) in the automobile insurance market in Canada, and 
Saito (2006) in the automobile insurance market in Japan. 
coverage and on low risk with high coverage. 
It is very important to recognize that both Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and de 
Meza and Webb (2001) adopt one-period models. Thus, if the insurance market settles 
on a separating equilibrium, the insurer should in the next period have full 
information on the risk type or risk preference of the insured. When the equilibrium of 
an insurance market under adverse selection is a separating equilibrium as shown by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the insurance companies can predict the risk types of 
those who continue to be insured in the next period since the market equilibrium has 
screened the policyholders. The insured who purchases a high coverage in the last 
period will be a high risk type individual. On the other hand, when the equilibrium of 
an insurance market under advantageous selection is a separating equilibrium as 
shown by de Meza and Webb (2001), the insurance companies could also predict the 
preference of those continuing to be insured in the next period since the separating 
equilibrium has screened the degree of risk preference. In contrast to Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976), de Meza and Webb (2001) predict that the insured who purchases a 
high coverage contract in the last period will be a low-risk individual. 
In this paper, we intend to examine whether purchasing records do in fact contain 
valuable information to predict the risk of the insured. The method we propose could 
be treated as a new methodology to distinguish adverse selection from advantageous 
selection. In the literature, most papers identify adverse selection or advantageous 
selection based on the relationship between the risk and coverage in the same year. In 
this paper, we employ the relationship between purchasing records (coverage) in the 
previous year and claim records (risk) in the current year to examine whether adverse 
selection rather than advantageous selection exists in the market. 
Using purchasing records to test the existence of adverse selection could further 
separate adverse selection from moral hazard. In the literature, many papers test the 
correlation between risk and coverage in the same year to identify the existence of 
adverse selection. However, as noted by Chiappori and Salanie (2000), both moral 
hazard and adverse selection predict a positive correlation between the choice of the 
coverage and the occurrence of the risk. Thus, the method we propose in this paper 
could also serve to provide evidences for the existence of adverse selection which 
cannot be explained by moral hazard. We investigate the relationship between the 
occurrence of the risk in this year and the purchasing records in the previous year. 
Moral hazard predicts that higher coverage, less effort on loss prevention, and higher 
risk. Thus, the occurrence of the risk this year should be correlated to the coverage in 
this year rather than the previous year purchasing records. Of course, it should be 
pointed out that finding evidence to support the existence of adverse selection does 
not automatically reject the possible existence of moral hazard. 
While the separating equilibrium is a screening mechanism, it needs to be asked 
whether it offers information regarding the risk type of the insured or information 
regarding the risk preference of the insured. This can be judged by observing the 
relationship between the past purchasing records and the probability of risk occurring 
in this period. If there is a significant positive relationship between past purchasing 
records and the probability of claims occurring in this period, the screening 
mechanism could offer a chance to predict the risk of the insured as deduced by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). On the other hand, if there is a significant negative 
relationship between past purchasing records and the probability of claims occurring 
in this period, the screening mechanism could offer a chance to predict the risk 
preference of the insured and supports de Meza and Webb (2001). 
The other question we ask in this paper is whether the asymmetric information 
could be partially reduced if the insurance company were able to observe the past 
purchasing records of the insured. We hypothesize that past purchasing records should 
be able to reduce the asymmetric information caused by either advantageous selection 
as noted by de Meza and Webb (2001) or adverse selection as described by Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976). Because policyholders have been screened under a separating 
equilibrium, past purchasing records contain information related to the risk types or 
risk preferences of individuals and should mitigate the problem of asymmetric 
information. However, we hypothesize that past purchasing records may not be able 
to reduce the asymmetric information caused by moral hazard, since moral hazard is 
induced by the coverage of the current insurance policy rather than the coverage of 
past insurance policies. Hence, after the past purchasing records are controlled for, the 
asymmetric information problem may still exist, and only its severity will have been 
reduced if moral hazard also exists in the market. 
Our target is to investigate the asymmetric information problems in the 
comprehensive automobile insurance3 market for Taiwan. We believe that the market 
provides a natural experiment for us to examine whether the purchasing records could 
predict risk and reduce asymmetric information. Before 1999, the Taiwan 
comprehensive automobile insurance market consisted of two types of insurance 
coverage: type A and type B. Both types A and B can be treated as “all-risk” coverage, 
since type A is exactly an all-risks basis insurance coverage and type B covers all 
risks except unknown risks. Due to the deteriorating loss ratio, in 1999 insurance 
companies launched type C coverage which covers the loss only if the automobile 
accident involves more than one car4. We believe that the launching of type C 
                                                 
3 In Taiwan, there are three different types of comprehensive coverage: A, B, and C. Type A covers all 
kinds of collision and non-collision losses, including those caused by missiles or falling objects, fire, 
explosion, windstorm, intentional body damage, malicious mischief, and any unidentified reasons other 
than the exclusions in the policy.  Type B covers all the areas for type A but excludes the non-collision 
losses caused by intentional body damage, malicious mischief, and any unidentified reasons.  Type C 
covers only damage in a collision involving two or more vehicles.  Collision losses caused by hitting 
other objects—such as a telephone pole, a tree, or a building—and non-collision losses that used to be 
covered under types A and B are specifically excluded from type C. 
4 In this paper, from the viewpoint of the risk the insurance contract covers, we separate those 
coverage provides us with an opportunity to examine how insurance companies 
screen policyholders by offering product menu in the market. 
Several papers in the literature have already provided evidence to support the 
existence of asymmetric information in Taiwan’s comprehensive automobile 
insurance market. Wang (2006a, 2006b) found that, in a sample of type A and type C 
coverage as well as a sample of type B and type C coverage, the relationship between 
the coverage and the risk is positive and might support the existence of adverse 
selection and/or moral hazard. Furthermore, Li et al. (2007)5 and Wang et al. (2008)6 
also found evidence to support the existence of adverse selection and/or moral hazard 
in the market. The existence of adverse selection and/or moral hazard could provide 
us with a unique opportunity to examine whether past purchasing records are able to 
control adverse selection and reduce asymmetric information. 
Hence, our first purpose is to determine whether the past purchasing records 
could reveal some valuable information regarding the risk of the insured. We then try 
to identify whether an asymmetric information problem exists in the market and 
whether it can be eliminated or mitigated by controlling the past records. Furthermore, 
if the asymmetric information is only mitigated by past purchasing records, we try to 
                                                                                                                                            
contracts according to whether the contract covers all risks or not. Hence, type A and B contracts are 
treated as high coverage contracts because they cover all risks, and a type C contract is treated as a low 
coverage contract because it only covers the risk of accidents involving more than one car. 
5 They define coverage by the deductible level within the type B contract: the contracts with a low 
deductible are high coverage contracts, and the contracts with a high deductible are low coverage 
contracts. 
6 Our definition of coverage is consistent with their paper. 
provide some evidence to explain the phenomena. 
Our data provide us with a unique advantage in examining the relationship 
between past records and asymmetric information. In the literature, relatively few 
papers7 have access to information on past purchasing records. Since our data 
comprise a tracking sample, we are not only able to have past claim records, but we 
are also able to have access to the past purchasing records from the early stages of the 
launching of the type C contract. We started collecting the data immediately after the 
type C coverage was launched from the year 2001 to the year 2006. We traced the past 
purchasing records of the previous year8 for the contracts which continued for at least 
one year. Hence, the data based on those continued contracts extends from the year 
2002 to the year 2006, and we have used the pooled data with 216,942 observations to 
perform our tests. 
By pooling these data, we find that the previous year’s purchasing records of the 
insured could reveal valuable information regarding risk type. The insured have a 
higher probability of filing a claim this year if they chose a high coverage contract last 
year. The empirical evidence strongly supports the view that past purchasing records 
can increase the prediction power of loss probability. This is consistent with 
                                                 
7 Dionne et al. (2006) use data from past purchasing records to try to disentangle moral hazard from 
the other asymmetric information phenomena. 
8 We have also already adopted the test which uses past purchasing records for more than one year. We 
find that all the empirical findings using more than one year of records are similar to those using one 
year of past purchasing records. Hence, in this paper, we only trace records for one year. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and also supports adverse selection rather than 
advantageous selection. 
Not surprisingly, we also find that asymmetric information does exist in the early 
stages of this market. For type A and type B contracts versus the type C contract, the 
relationship between the choice of coverage and the occurrence of the risk is found to 
be significantly positive and supports the existence of adverse selection and/or moral 
hazard. This finding is consistent with Wang et al. (2008), Wang (2006a, 2006b), and 
Li et al. (2007), who also found that asymmetric information exists in this early stage 
of Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. 
Furthermore, we find that, after controlling past records (both the claim records 
and the purchasing records), the conditional correlation between the choice of 
coverage and the occurrence of the risk is still significantly positive, but the 
magnitude of the correlation becomes smaller. Our empirical evidence generally 
supports the view that the past purchasing records cannot fully eliminate the 
asymmetric problems if moral hazard and adverse selection co-exist in the market. If 
the market is haunted by moral hazard, past records could eliminate adverse selection 
rather than moral hazard. Controlling past records may have a limited effect on 
mitigating the asymmetric information in the market. 
To support the above assertion, we further investigate whether moral hazard 
exists in the market. The methodology we employ to test for the existence of moral 
hazard is inspired by Abbring et al. (2003). They argued that the insured who has 
already filed a claim in the previous year will be charged a high premium this year 
and he/she will change his/her purchasing decision from high coverage to low 
coverage. If the behavior of the insured is unobservable information for the insurer, 
i.e., there is a moral hazard problem, after the higher premium is charged, he/she will 
change to a lower coverage contract and pay more attention. Therefore, his/her 
probability of making a claim this year will be lower and negatively correlated with 
the occurrence of the claim in the previous year. However, Abbring et al. (2003) did 
not find such evidence. 
Abbring et al. (2003) only test the relationship between the previous year’s 
claims and this year’s claims. In this paper, we will not only examine both the 
relationship between the insured’s previous year’s claims and this year’s claims and 
the relationship between the insured’s previous year’s claims and this year’s choice of 
coverage, but we will also further examine the trend in terms of the choice of 
coverage and the claims in this year for the insured who had purchased high coverage 
and had claimed in the previous year. We find that the insured’s previous year’s 
claims and this year’s claims are positively correlated while the insured’s previous 
year’s claims and this year’s choice of coverage are negatively correlated. 
Furthermore, we find that the insured who purchased high coverage and filed a claim 
in the previous year is even less likely to file a claim this year than the insured who 
purchased low coverage and filed a claim in the previous year. Moreover, we find that 
the insured who purchased high coverage and filed a claim in the previous year is 
even less likely to purchase a high-coverage contract than the insured who purchased 
low coverage and filed a claim in the previous year. This can more clearly describe 
the behavior of moral hazard. Thus, our empirical evidence supports the existence of 
moral hazard and indirectly explains why past purchasing records cannot fully 
eliminate asymmetric information in the market. 
Our empirical findings contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we propose 
a new method to examine the existence of adverse selection and find that past 
purchasing records contain valuable private information regarding the risk type of the 
insured. This finding supports the prediction of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and 
cannot be explained by moral hazard. Secondly, we find that, after controlling for the 
past purchasing records, there still exists a positive conditional correlation between 
coverage and risk. We assert that past records could control adverse selection but not 
moral hazard. Third, we further test the dynamic behavior of the insured and, in 
addition to adverse selection, indirectly find evidence to support the view that moral 
hazard also exists, and thereby further strengthen our argument. 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section consists of the Introduction.  
In the second section we describe the data, and the methodology we have adopted is 
described in the third section. The empirical results are then presented in the fourth 
section, and the final section provides the Conclusion. 
Data 
Our data are obtained from one large insurance company in Taiwan. Since the 
loss rate and loss ratio of that company are close to that of the market as a whole, we 
believe that the data from this insurance company are representative of the industry. 
The dependent variables comprise the choice of the coverage and the occurrence of 
the claim. The variables representing the information used by the insurer in 
underwriting and/or pricing include the content and the distribution channel of the 
contract, and the characteristics of the insured. We also collect both the claim records 
and the purchasing records. The definitions of all variables are given in Table 1.  
The sample period extends from the year 2001 to the year 2006. In each sample 
year we estimated, we traced one year of past records. Hence, the contracts that this 
paper investigates are those of the insured who continued in this insurance company 
for at least one year. Accordingly, our sample contains five sample periods which are 
the years from 2002 to 2006. We pool them together to implement our empirical 
analysis and control them by means of four year dummy variables: year_2002, 
year_2003, year_2004, and year_2005, with the sample for the year 2006 serving as 
the reference group. The percentage for each sample period can be observed from 
year_2002, year_2003, year _2004, and year_2005 in Table 2, with the growth trend 
of the ongoing contracts in this market that are owned by this insurance company 
being displayed there. A total of 43.68% of the continued contracts are high coverage 
type A and type B contracts. 
Most of the insured are good drivers from the point of view of experience rating. 
The percentage of insured whose bonus-malus coefficients are under 0.9 is over 64%, 
while the percentage of insured whose bonus-malus coefficients are above 0.9, but 
under 1, is 31.81%. Some 24% of those who continue to be insured have filed a claim 
in the current year, and the average number of claims is 0.29. Hence, the average 
number of claims for those who are insured who have already filed a claim this year is 
1.29. 
By observing the previous year’s purchasing records and the structure of 
different types of contracts this year, we find that there is no dramatic structural 
change in the percentages of contract coverage year by year, although there is a 
gradually decreasing trend in high coverage contracts.  
With previous year purchasing and claim records, we create a total of three 
variables to filter information concerning the characteristics of the insured. These 
variables include one variable for past purchasing records, one variable for claims in 
the previous year, and one multiple term created by the purchasing and claim records 
in the previous year10. 
                                                 
9 The maximum number of claims to occur in our sample is eight in one year. 
10 The term clm_b1*coverage_b1 refers to the insured who purchased high coverage and who had also 
made a claim in the previous year 
Methodology 
In our empirical work, we first investigate whether past purchasing records 
contain valuable information concerning risk. Hence, we test the significance of 
purchasing records in explaining accidents. 
Through observing our data set, we find that the numbers of claims for the 
insured who have previously filed claims vary quite significantly. We believe that the 
degree of risk could be heterogeneous among those who filed different numbers of 
claims. Hence, to treat each insured who has filed a claim by ignoring his or her claim 
number could lead to bias while we estimate the probability of a claim as representing 
the degree of the insured’s risk. 
To avoid the above concern, we consider that the risk degree of risk could vary 
with the number of accidents. Hence, we use the negative binomial model instead of a 
Probit regression model to estimate the probability of risk as was the case in Lemaire 
(1989) and Dionne and Vanasse (1989). 
In the negative binomial model, the regression component is introduced in the 
negative binomial model: 
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The above expression represents a negative binomial distribution with 
)exp()|( 1 βiii XXYE =  and ))exp(1)(exp()|( 111 βαβ iiii XXXYVar += , and 
ii clmnoY = . The vector iX 1  contains the explanatory variables11 which could affect 
the number of accidents involving the insured. ii clmnoY =  is the real number of 
accidents that occurred. α  and β  are the estimated coefficients for the exponential 
term in the distribution function and each corresponding characteristic variable. 
Note that we treat a policy as one with higher coverage if the policy provides a 
broader coverage of accident items in this paper. We treat both type A and type B 
contracts as high coverage because both of them involve all-risks type coverage, 
whereas type C contracts cover collision only. However, it should be recognized that 
both type A and type B contracts include deductibles, while type C contracts do not. 
Thus, we further adjust the deductible while we define the claim to calculate 
iclmno
12. 
Meanwhile, the type C contract only covers the collision accident, while the type 
A and B contracts also cover the accident beyond the collision. To avoid the concern 
over spurious correlation as mentioned by Chiappori and Salanie (2000), for all types 
of contracts, we define the accident as only a claim involving a collision so as to have 
a consistent base among different contracts. 
                                                 
11 The vector 1X  contains the past records, the multiple term for the past purchasing and claim 
records (clm_b1*coverage_b1), the demographic variables of the insured, and the control variables in 
Table 1. 
12 We regard the deductible for all of the type C contracts as being NT$3,000. The way we adjust the 
deductibles between high coverage contracts (i.e., type A and B contracts) and low coverage contracts 
(i.e., type C contracts) involves defining an accident by a claim for a type C contract as being 
NT$3,000 higher than a claim for a type A or type B contract. 
    The parameters α  and β  in equation (1) are estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method. When we seek to determine whether there is valuable information 
regarding the risk revealed by the past purchasing records or not, the key coefficient 
we test is the estimated coefficient of the past purchasing record variables, i.e., 
coverage_b1.  
If the coefficient of the previous year purchasing record variable (coverage_b1) 
is significantly positive, this means that the higher coverage that the insured chose in 
the previous year may result in the insured having more accidents in the current year. 
This evidence proves that purchasing records contain valuable information regarding 
the risk type of the insured and supports what Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) predicted. 
If it is significantly negative, it means that the higher coverage that the insured chose 
in the previous year may result in the insured having fewer accidents in the current 
year. This evidence proves that the purchasing records contain valuable information 
regarding the risk preference of the insured and supports what de Meza and Webb 
(2001) predicted. 
The second intention of this paper is to test the existence of the asymmetric 
information in this market, and to further test whether this asymmetric information 
could be mitigated by controlling the past records. Hence, we apply two models to test 
the asymmetric information We do not control the past record variables13 in Model 1, 
whereas we control the past record variables in Model 2. The asymmetric information 
phenomena are tested based on the conditional correlation between risk and coverage. 
Similar to the methodology used by Dionne, Gourieroux and Vanasse (2001), the 
conditional correlation is obtained by using the two-stage method. 
In the first stage, we use a negative binomial model associated with all the 
exogenous variables concerned with the characteristics of the insured to calculate the 
expected number of accidents ( nomcl ˆ ) of the insured. The second stage is then a 
Probit on the coverage choice of the insured: 
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where eragecov  is the dummy variable of coverage choice which is defined in 
Table 1. The regressors include the estimated number of accidents from the first stage 
( nomcl ˆ ), the number of accidents this year ( iclmno ), as well as the vector iX 2  
which contains the factors that affect the coverage choice of the insured14. 1β , 2β , 
and 3β  are the estimated coefficients of nomcl ˆ , iclmno  and iX 2 , respectively. 
In this Probit regression, among all the estimated coefficients, 2β  is the key 
coefficient we use to test the asymmetric information. If 2β  is significantly positive, 
                                                 
13 This includes the past record variables in Table 1 and the multiple term clm_b1*coverage_b1. 
14 In Model 2, the variables included in iX 2  are all the explanatory variables contained in iX 1  as 
well as the variable of lnprem. In Model 1, the variables in iX 2  not includes all the past record 
variables. 
it is evidence that adverse selection and/or moral hazard exists in the market. If 2β  is 
significantly negative, it is evidence that advantageous selection exists in the market. 
Hence, in Model 1, we observe the significant level and the sign of 2β  to infer 
whether and what asymmetric information exists in the market. We further intend to 
test whether the asymmetric information could be mitigated through controlling the 
past records. In Model 2 which controls the previous year’s past records in the first 
stage, if 2β  is significantly different from zero in Model 1 and becomes 
insignificantly different from zero (significantly different from zero but the value 
turns smaller), we can infer that the asymmetric information of this market can be 
eliminated (be mitigated) by controlling the past records of the insured. 
If the asymmetric information in this market is only mitigated instead of being 
eliminated after the previous year’s past records are controlled for, the third intention 
of this paper is to explain the phenomena by providing evidence to support the view 
that moral hazard may also exist in this market. 
We follow the ideas of Abbring et al. (2003). we have examined the relationship 
between the past claims and this year’s claims using the negative binomial regression 
model (1). To more directly test the existence of moral hazard, we further investigate 
the relationship between the past records and this year’s purchasing decisions. Hence, 
we build the following Probit regression for the purchasing decisions: 
)(
)1(covProb
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where the definition of eragecov  is the same as that in regression (2). The vector 
iX 3  contains the past records of clm_b1, coverage_b1 and their multiple term 
clm_b1*coverage_b1, as well as the factors affecting the coverage choice of the 
insured15. γ  is their correspondent coefficient vector. In this regression, the key 
variables that need to be observed are those coefficients of clm_b1, coverage_b1, and 
clm_b1*coverage_b1.  
We predict that the coefficient of clm_b1 could be negative because of the 
punishment of experience rate, and the coefficient of coverage_b1 should be positive 
if the past purchasing records reveal the information regarding the insured’s risk type. 
Meanwhile, if the moral hazard exists, the insured who has purchased high coverage 
and has already filed a claim in the previous year will change to a lower coverage 
contract in the current year due to being punished by the bonus-malus coefficient. 
Meanwhile, he/she will reduce his/her claims in the current year. Hence, we predict 
that the coefficient of clm_b1*coverage_b1 in the negative binomial regression (1) 
should be significantly negative, and that the coefficient of clm_b1*coverage_b1 in 
the Probit regression (3) should be significantly negative, too. 
 
                                                 
15 In words, all the variables are already included in iX 2 . 
Empirical results 
    Whether or not valuable information is revealed by the past purchasing records 
can be observed from the negative binomial model which is regressed on the number 
of claims. The empirical results are presented in Table 3. The estimated coefficient of 
coverage_b1 is significantly positive. From this outcome, we can infer that the 
previous year’s purchasing records do reveal important information regarding the risk 
of the insured. The higher the coverage that the insured chose in the previous year 
could result in the insured being involved in more accidents this year. This evidence 
does support the prediction of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). By observing the choice 
of coverage of the insured in the previous year, the insured who chose a contract with 
high coverage could signal that he or she is a high risk type, hence, and could be 
involved in more accidents next year. 
    Furthermore, there are also some by-products that can be observed from the 
outcomes in Table 3. First, the coefficient of the past claim records is significantly 
positive. These outcomes reveal that the risk type of the insured cannot be changed 
over time, and thus the one who is currently a high risk type may always be a high 
risk type. This makes the correlation between the previous year’s claims and this 
year’s claims positive. Hence, this outcome could be regarded as evidence of adverse 
selection. Secondly, the coefficient of clm_b1*coverage_b1 is significantly negative. 
This means that the insured who purchased high coverage in the previous year but had 
filed a claim would be less likely to file a claim this year. Why is that? Because of the 
experience rating system, the insured who filed a claim in the previous year could be 
charged a higher premium and therefore may change his or her choice of coverage 
and adopt low coverage instead. The low insurance coverage could further provide a 
stronger incentive for the insured to expend more efforts on preventing the occurrence 
of the risk, which implies the existence of moral hazard. 
The empirical results for the conditional correlation between risk and coverage 
based on the two-stage method are listed in Table 4. In Model 1, before we control 
any past records, the coefficient 2β  is significantly positive. This is evidence that 
adverse selection and/or moral hazard exist in this market. Such a finding is consistent 
with those presented in Table 3. 
In Model 2, after controlling the records of the past year, the coefficient 2β  is 
still significantly positive. However, compared with its value in Model 1, the value of 
coefficient 2β  declines from 0.7606 to 0.4283. This outcome implies that the 
asymmetric information phenomenon still exists after past records are controlled. In 
spite of this, with the help of the information revealed by those past records that also 
include the purchasing records, the asymmetric information could be mitigated. 
The above outcomes are consistent with two of our hypotheses. First, controlling 
past records could mitigate the severity of asymmetric information. Second, the past 
purchasing records could control the asymmetric information regarding adverse 
selection but not the asymmetric information regarding moral hazard. Hence, after the 
past purchasing records are controlled, the 2β  coefficient becomes small, but it is 
still significant since both adverse selection and moral hazard co-exist in the market. 
    To further support our assertions, we conduct another Probit regression to study 
the relationship between the purchasing decisions for this year, i.e., choice of 
coverage, and past records. The outcomes are provided in Table 5. We can observe 
from Table 5 that the coefficient of _ 1clm b  is significantly negative which implies 
that the insured who had previously filed a claim are less likely to purchase high 
coverage in the current year. Furthermore, the coefficient of clm_b1*coverage_b1 is 
also significantly negative which implies that the insured who chose high coverage 
and filed a claim in the previous year will be more likely to change to low coverage 
this year. The empirical evidence seems to support the view that the moral hazard 
exists in the market and provides indirect evidence to explain why past purchasing 
records could not fully eliminate the asymmetric information problems in the market.               
 
Conclusions 
Asymmetric information problems in the insurance market could arise from 
adverse selection, moral hazard, advantageous selection, or a combination of them. 
Hence, the evidence on asymmetric information that is based on different empirical 
studies is inconsistent. This paper investigates the asymmetric information problems 
for the comprehensive insurance market in Taiwan’s automobile insurance industry 
where we have a unique dataset of a tracking sample with 216,942 observations. 
The first contribution of this paper is that we propose a new method to test 
adverse selection against advantageous selection and to identify whether valuable 
information is contained in past purchasing records. We find that the insured who 
have previously chosen a high coverage contract tend to have more accidents in the 
following year. This evidence fits the prediction of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and 
supports the existence of adverse selection. 
The second contribution of this paper is that we find that the asymmetric 
information could be mitigated by obtaining valuable information from past 
purchasing and claim records for those who continue to be insured. We find that 
controlling the past records could decrease the 2β  coefficient of Probit regression 
(2), i.e., mitigate the positive conditional correlation between risk and coverage. 
However, there still exists significant positive conditional correlation. This is because 
the past records can only effectively reveal risk type information and mitigate the 
forces of adverse selection. Hence, for ongoing contracts, the insurance company 
could observe the risk type according to the previous choice of coverage of the 
insured since they could be screened by the menu of contracts that the insurance 
company has offered. Controlling the past records of coverage choice as well as 
claims could help to control the risk type of the insured and mitigate the adverse 
selection in the market. As for the forces of moral hazard, there is no compelling 
reason why past records could help reveal this information and also control it. 
Finally, the third contribution of the paper is that we provide empirical evidence 
to support the existence of moral hazard in the market. The same evidence also 
indirectly supports our assertion that past purchasing records can not fully control 
asymmetric information problems with both moral hazard and adverse selection. 
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Table 1  Definitions of the Variables 
Variable        Definition 
claim   a dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured has previously filed a claim16 this year, 
otherwise it equals 0 
coverage a dummy variable that equals 1 when an individual chooses a high coverage, i.e., a type A or 
type B contract, otherwise it equals 0 
clmno           observed number of claims17 this year 
Past records: 
clm_b1              a dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured has claimed during the previous year, 
otherwise it equals 0. 
coverage_b1          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured chooses a high coverage contract in the 
  last year, otherwise it equals 0. 
ER1                 a dummy variable that equals 1 when the bonus-malus coefficient equals or is under 0.9, 
otherwise it equals 0. 
ER2                 a dummy variable that equals 1 when the bonus-malus coefficient equals or is under 1, 
but above 0.9, otherwise it equals 018. 
Demographic  variables: 
carage1        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is one year old, otherwise it equals 0. 
carage2       a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is two years old, otherwise it equals 0 
carage3        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is three years old, otherwise it equals 0 
carage4        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is four years old, otherwise it equals 0 
carage5        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is five years old, otherwise it equals 0 
carage6        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is six years old, otherwise it equals 0 
carage7        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is seven years old, otherwise it equals 019 
catpcd_1        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is a sedan and is for non-commercial or for 
long-term rental purposes, otherwise it equals 0 
catpcd_2        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is a small freight-truck and is for 
non-commercial purposes or for business use, otherwise it equals 0 
tramak_i        i=n,f,h,t,c, a dummy variable that equals 1when the trademark of the car is the assigned brand, 
otherwise it equals 0 
channel_i         a dummy variable that equals 1 when the policy is sold through the channel i, where i=D, T, L, 
F, A, otherwise it equals 0. 
                                                 
16 When we compare type A and B contracts with a type C contract, the definition of a claim 
encompasses those claims from a collision, and the adjusted deductible by defining a claim for a type C 
contract is NT$3,000 higher than a claim for a type A or type B contract.. 
17 The definition of a claim is the same as it is in the previous note. 
18 The smaller value of the bonus-malus coefficient means that the driver had a better record. The reference 
group for the two dummy variables of the bonus-malus coefficients includes those coefficients above 1. 
19 The reference group for those dummy variables for the car age is that which includes all the cars 
used over seven years. 
city         a dummy variable that equals 1 when the owner of the car lives in a city, otherwise it equals 0 
north          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the north of Taiwan, otherwise it 
equals 0 
south          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the south of Taiwan, otherwise it 
equals 0 
east        a dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the east of Taiwan, otherwise it 
equals 020 
sexf            a dummy variable that equals 1 when the owner of the car is female, otherwise it equals 0 
married         a dummy variable that equals 1 when the owner of car is married, otherwise it equals 0 
age1          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured is between the ages of 30 and 25, otherwise 
it equals 0 
age2          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured is between the ages of 60 and 30, otherwise 
it equals 0 
age3          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured is over the age of 60, otherwise it equals 021 
Control variables: 
lnprem             logarithm of the premium for the year of each policy. 
year_2002          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the data belong to the year 2002, otherwise it equals 
0. 
year_2003          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the data belong to the year 2003, otherwise it equals 
0. 
year_2004          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the data belong to the year 2004, otherwise it equals 
0. 
year_2005          a dummy variable that equals 1 when the data belong to the year 2005, otherwise it equals 
0.22 
                                                 
20 The reference group for those three dummy variables of area is the cars registered in the middle of 
Taiwan. 
21 The reference group for those dummy variables of age includes the insured who are under 25 years 
old. 
22 The reference group for those dummy variables of year is the year 2006. 
Table 2  The Basic Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
claim 0.2439  0.4294  
coverage 0.4368  0.4960  
clmno 0.2949  0.5732  
clm_b1 0.2439 0.4294 
coverage_b1 0.5093  0.4999  
ER1 0.6454  0.4784  
ER2 0.3181  0.4657  
carage1 0.1836  0.3872  
carage2 0.1519  0.3589  
carage3 0.1305  0.3369  
carage4 0.1053  0.3069  
carage5 0.0814  0.2735  
carage6 0.0577  0.2332  
carage7 0.0367  0.1881  
catpcd_1 0.9770  0.1498  
catpcd_2 0.0145  0.1197  
tramak_n 0.0067  0.0815  
tramak_f 0.0996  0.2994  
tramak_h 0.0716  0.2579  
tramak_t 0.3602  0.4801  
tramak_c 0.0811  0.2730  
channel_D 0.3814  0.4857  
channel_T 0.0044  0.0662  
channel_L 0.0176  0.1315  
channel_F 0.0131  0.1137  
channel_A 0.0209  0.1430  
city 0.5815  0.4933  
north 0.5479  0.4977  
south 0.2284  0.4198  
east 0.0258  0.1584  
sexf 0.6715  0.4697  
married 0.9232  0.2662  
age1 0.0369  0.1886  
age2 0.9134  0.2813  
age3 0.0477  0.2131  
lnprem 9.1547  0.8218  
year_2002 0.1400  0.3470  
year_2003 0.1756  0.3804  
year_2004 0.1951  0.3962  
year_2005 0.2268  0.4188  
Number of observations 216942 
Table 3   The regression for the negative binomial model, regressed on the 
number of claims 
 
Dependent Variable: clmno  
Estimated Equation (1) 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -1.3149*** <.0001 
clm_b1 0.1939*** <.0001 
coverage_b1 0.4793*** <.0001 
clm_b1*coverage_b1 -0.0173** 0.0181 
ER1 -0.3041*** <.0001 
ER2 -0.1325*** <.0001 
carage1 0.1061*** <.0001 
carage2 0.0305** 0.0335 
carage3 -0.0041 0.7826 
carage4 -0.0179 0.2395 
carage5 -0.0249 0.1162 
carage6 -0.0296* 0.0803 
carage7 -0.0147 0.4254 
catpcd_1 0.0619* 0.0971 
catpcd_2 -0.1775*** 0.0001 
tramak_n 0.0059 0.8732 
tramak_f 0.0005 0.9613 
tramak_h -0.0687*** <.0001 
tramak_t -0.0095 0.1765 
tramak_c -0.0328*** 0.0096 
channel_D 0.1423*** <.0001 
channel_T 0.0677 0.1280 
channel_L 0.1840*** <.0001 
channel_F 0.0458* 0.0905 
channel_A -0.0627*** 0.0070 
city -0.0177*** 0.0054 
north -0.0936*** <.0001 
south -0.0174** 0.0532 
east 0.0116 0.5508 
sexf 0.1778*** <.0001 
marria_ 0.0246** 0.0368 
age1 -0.1295** 0.0384 
Note: The 99% significance level is denoted by ***. 
The 95% significance level is denoted by **. 
The 90% significance level is denoted by *. 
 
           
 
  
age2 0.0477 0.4616 
age3 -0.0069 0.9148 
year_2002 0.3329*** <.0001 
year_2003 0.2524*** <.0001 
year_2004 0.2228*** <.0001 
year_2005 0.1961*** <.0001 
 
Table 4  Probit on coverage choice (the second stage of the two-stage method) 
 
Dependent Variable: eragecov  
Estimated Equation (2) 
Model 1 Model 2  
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -22.7742*** <.0001 -12.3820*** <.0001 
clmno 0.7606*** <.0001 0.4283*** <.0001 
nomcl ˆ  0.0283*** <.0001 1.6666*** <.0001 
carage1 0.1520*** <.0001 -0.8329*** 0.0001 
carage2 0.6002*** 0.0073 -0.1985*** 0.0023 
carage3 0.7334* 0.0816 0.0477** 0.0265 
carage4 0.7963 0.2589 0.1590 0.4171 
carage5 0.8053 0.6641 0.2265 0.6419 
carage6 0.7680 0.3471 0.1280 0.7795 
carage7 0.7159 0.3715 0.3572 0.6541 
catpcd_1 -0.1227*** 0.0030 2.5183*** 0.0021 
catpcd_2 2.1171 0.1742 -0.5267 0.3478 
tramak_n -0.5811*** 0.0035 0.2290** 0.0124 
tramak_f 0.3421*** 0.0033 0.5469** 0.0311 
tramak_h 0.3855*** <.0001 0.1745*** <.0001 
tramak_t 0.2519*** <.0001 0.2031*** <.0001 
tramak_c 0.0404** 0.0117 0.0332** 0.0335 
channel_D -0.0915*** <.0001 -0.7435*** <.0001 
channel_T -0.1608*** 0.0036 -0.4416 0.1913 
channel_L -0.0346 0.2982 -0.8376 0.3961 
channel_F -0.2394*** <.0001 -0.4593* 0.0882 
channel_A 0.1346*** <.0001 0.3661*** <.0001 
city 0.0194** 0.0158 1.6365*** <.0001 
north 0.0067*** <.0001 0.3449*** <.0001 
south -0.0108 0.3594 0.0317 0.2290 
east -0.0257 0.2948 -0.1526 0.3964 
sexf 0.5812*** <.0001 -0.0842*** <.0001 
marria_ -0.0526*** 0.0004 -0.4865*** 0.0001 
age1 1.2696** 0.0221 1.9173** 0.0201 
age2 1.8808 0.3578 1.7198 0.3492 
age3 1.6636 0.5412 -1.4890 0.5217 
 Note: (1) Model 1 hasn’t controlled the previous year’s past records in the first stage 
Model 2 has controlled the previous year’s past records in the first stage 
(2) The 99% significance level is denoted by ***. 
           The 95% significance level is denoted by **. 
         The 90% significance level is denoted by *. 
lnprem 2.1157*** <.0001 1.4708*** <.0001 
year_2002 0.3603*** <.0001 -0.7968*** <.0001 
year_2003 0.2441*** <.0001 -0.6686*** <.0001 
year_2004 0.1394*** <.0001 -0.6462*** <.0001 
year_2005 0.0394** 0.0212 -0.6725*** <.0001 
 
Table 5  The Probit regression of purchasing decisions this year, regressed on 
past records 
 
Dependent Variable: eragecov  
Estimated Equation (3) 
Variable  Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -22.3039*** <.0001 
clm_b1 -0.6687*** <.0001 
coverage_b1 3.2247*** <.0001 
clm_b1*coverage_b1 -0.4875*** <.0001 
ER1 -0.0378 0.4570 
ER2 -0.0776** 0.0394 
carage1 -1.1993*** <.0001 
carage2 -0.7286*** <.0001 
carage3 -0.1948*** <.0001 
carage4 0.0019 0.9477 
carage5 0.1024 0.9288 
carage6 0.1191 0.8733 
carage7 0.0797 0.6287 
catpcd_1 -0.0814 0.1637 
catpcd_2 1.8637 0.4723 
tramak_n -0.6189*** <.0001 
tramak_f 0.3319*** <.0001 
tramak_h 0.2826*** <.0001 
tramak_t 0.1503*** <.0001 
tramak_c 0.1023*** <.0001 
channel_D -0.1164*** <.0001 
channel_T -0.3123*** <.0001 
channel_L -0.1616*** <.0001 
channel_F -0.3390*** <.0001 
channel_A -0.0297 0.4356 
city 0.0918*** <.0001 
north 0.1820*** <.0001 
south 0.0445*** 0.0060 
east 0.0960*** 0.0045 
sexf 0.4843*** <.0001 
marria_ -0.0595*** 0.0029 
age1 0.7965*** <.0001 
age2 1.1607 0.1354 
age3 0.9033 0.3215 
lnprem 2.0717*** <.0001 
year_2002 0.4476*** <.0001 
year_2003 0.2677*** <.0001 
year_2004 0.1966*** <.0001 
year_2005 0.0624*** <.0001 
Note: The 99% significance level is denoted by ***. 
      The 95% significance level is denoted by **. 
       The 90% significance level is denoted by *. 
